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THE HUSBAND-WIFE EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The purpose of this comment is to identify and
analyze the various problems confronting the
courts when applying the husband-wife evidentiary
privilege in criminal proceedings. For purposes of
simplicity, the areas of conflict will be divided
into two general categories: (1) what should the
privilege protect, and (2) who should have stand-
ing to invoke the privilege?'
In relation to admissible testimony in criminal
cases, the common law husband-wife privilege
operates on two levels. The privilege may first
be utilized to render the spouses incompetent to
testify for or against each other in a criminal
action.2
I Unless otherwise indicated, it will be presumed that
the wife is the witness and her husband the one at-
tempting to supress her testimony.
A proper classification of the common law privilege'
would regard the disability of the husband or wife to
testify for the party spouse as a disqualification and the
rule enabling the party spouse to prevent the husband
or wife from testifying against the party as a privilege.
8 WIGMoRE, EVmDNcE §2227 (3d ed. 1940);
McCoPICK, EVIDENCE §66 (1954). The basis for the
rule was that the husband and wife were a unity in
the eyes of the law, and since the litigant spouse was
incompetent to testify because of interest, the other
spouse was also considered incompetent. With the
passing of time this rationale was supplanted by the
fear of bias and harm to the domestic confidence.
Stapleton v. Crofts, 18 Q.B. 367, 370, 118 Eng. Rep.
137, 138 (1852).
However, a majority of jurisdictions have abrogated
the common law by statute, thereby rendering a spouse
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Secondly, the common law privilege3 permits
either spouse to restrain the other from relating
any confidential communication made between
them. Whereas the former privilege forbids a
competent to testify for or against the other in criminal
cases. See e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §311 (1940);
MO. STAT. ANw. §546.260 (1949); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch 233 §20 (1933); IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §734
(1959) ("In all criminal cases, husband and wife may
testify for or against each other; provided, that neither
may testify as to any communication . . . between
them during coverture, except in cases where either is
charged with an offense against the person and property
of the other. . . ."). However, even after the statute
was adopted, the Illinois Supreme Court persisted in
applying the common law rule of incompetency.
Heineman v. Hermann, 385 Ill. 191, 52 N.E.2d 263
(1944). In People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill.2d 409, 125 N.E.2d
518 (1955), the court finally recognized that the
statutory language had eliminated the common law
incompetency, leaving only a husband-wife privilege
against disclosure of confidential communications
between them.
Several states have by statute retained the common
law in taro (see e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §702 (1951);
IOWA CODE §622.7 (1946)) whereas other jurisdictions
view it as a privilege rather than as a complete dis-
qualification. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §1322 (1949);
MIm. STAT. ANN. §595.02 (1947) ("A husband cannot
be examined for or against his wife without her consent,
nor a wife for or against her husband without his con-
sent, nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards,
without the consent of the other, be examined as to
any communication made by one to the other during
the marriage. This exception does not apply to . . . a
criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed
by one against the other ... .").
A problem develops as to the scope of the term
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spouse to testify at all, for or against the other,
regardless of the actual testimony, the latter is
restricted to a certain class of testimony, namely
communications between the spouses or infor-
"criminal action or proceeding". In other words where
the incompetency privilege has been preserved or
modified by statute is such legislation relevant to a
trial in which one spouse is or is not a party, a prosecu-
tion of the husband and wife as co-conspirators, a
grand jury proceeding, a post trial inquiry, or a pre-
liminary hearing?
There is no dispute as to the operation of the privilege
in criminal prosecutions where the spouse of the witness
is the sole defendant, but can a wife be offered by the
state against her husband's co-defendant or co-in-
dictee? It is generally held that the privilege covers the
situation where the husband is now on trial with the
party against whom his'wife's testimony is directed.
However, if the husband has been convicted, acquitted,
or pleaded guilty the privilege may not be claimed.
Similarly, if the husband has obtained a separate trial
or has been separately indicted for the same offense, his
wife may testify at the trial of the co-defendant, not-
withstanding that the charge against her husband is
still pending and that her testimony may incriminate
him. A minority summarily hold that the wife is not a
competent witness in such a proceeding, but a few of
these deny the right to testify only where the offense
charged requires the joint act of the persons indicted
in order for either to be found guilty. 8 WIGMOE,
supra, §2236; State v. Gyngard, 333 S.W.2d 73 (Mo.
1960). The same principles are appropriate when the
co-defendant seeks to call the wife of his accomplice to
testify in his behalf. 2 WIGMORE, EVDENCE §609,607
(3d ed. 1940)
Where the husband is not a party in the criminal
trial, may his wife be called as a witness even though
her testimony is against his interest? On this point the
states retaining the common law incompetency privilege
are divided. Those which deem the wife incompetent
argue that as the genuine ground of the privilege is to
preserve domestic peace, it should apply to testimony
which in any way disfavors the other spouse, irrespec-
tive of his being a party to the action. On the other
hand, proponents of the position that the privilege is
inapplicable reason that in addition to the legal justifi-
cation that a party to a criminal action should not be
permitted to invoke a privilege belonging to another
there is also the practical consideration that the wife
may reveal her knowledge out of court. 8 WiGmomE,
supra, §2234, 2235.
Since it has been held that a husband and wife are
legally capable of conspiring with each other to commit
a criminal offense (United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51
(1960)), is either competent to testify for or against the
other in a prosecution against both as co-conspirators?
It would seem that in those states in which the husband
and wife are incompetent as witnesses in a criminal
prosecution, neither is a competent witness for or
against the other in a joint prosecution of both or even
in a separate trial of one under a joint indictment of
both. Andrews v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. 155, 179 S.W.2d
302 (1944); Hunt v. State, 160 Tex. Cr. 385, 269
S.W.2d 358 (1954) (Husband and wife charged with
conspiracy; husband tried separately and wife not
permitted to testify for him.). However, by statute the
majority place no limitation whatever on the qualifica-
tion of a co-indictee or co-defendant to testify either for
or against the accused. 2 WIGMORE, EvmxiEcE §580
(3d ed. 1940).
marion gained because of the marital relation.4
Despite this distinction, there appears to be a
common thread of justification for both of the
rules-the desire of the courts to preserve the
marital relationship.'
At common law a spouse was disqualified from
testifying for the other spouse as to any fact
regardless of the source from which it was derived.'
With reference to grand jury proceedings, where a
spouse is incompetent to testifyfor or against the other
spouse in a criminal prosecution, such incompetency
operates to exclude the spouse from testifying before
the grand jury. People v. Bladek, 259 Ill. 69, 102 N.E.
243 (1913). If a spouse is a competent witness at the
trial of the other, such spouse may testify before the
grand jury. People v. Budzinski, 289 N.Y.S. 656, 159
Misc. 566 (1936). It should be noted that although the
rule of People v. Bladek, supra this note, has not been
altered, the Illinois legislature has made either spouse
competent to testify in all criminal cases. -ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, §734 (1959). It therefore follows that
either spouse would be competent to testify for or
against the other before a grand jury in Illinois.
A somewhat diverse rule appears to be controlling in
post and pretrial hearings. In the case of In re Steve,
73 Cal.App.2d 697, 167 P.2d 243 (1946), a wife was
held a compellable witness in a post-conviction hearing
to determine the degree of the offense committed by her
husband. The court reasoned that such a proceeding
is not a trial in the full technical sense, and is not there-
fore governed by the same strict rules of procedure. It
is merely a statutory hearing in which the court may
consider many matters not admissible on the issue of
guilt or innocence. In view of the California statute
(supra this note) which makes either spouse incompe-
tent to testify for or against the other without the
consent of both, it may be said that the incompetency
privilege is unavailable in post trial hearings. And,
although direct authority is lacking, by analogy it may
be argued that the privilege is also inapplicable to pre-
trial hearings.
a In this country, the courts have frequently stated
that the statutes protecting marital communications
from disclosure are declaratory of the common law even
though no common law decision can be uncovered
which sanctions the privilege in advance of a statute.
Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897); Gjesdahl v.
Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 221 N.W. 639 (1928).
The confidential communications privilege is valid
for communications of a husband or wife not a party
to nor interested in the criminal proceeding. 8 Wio-
mopr, supra note 2, §2334; Bernell v. State, 74 Okla.
Cr. 92, 123 P.2d 289 (1942) (Murder prosecution; de-
fendant-husband precluded from testifying as to
whether his wife told him of threats of others.). Simi-
larly, the privilege may be asserted before a grand jury.
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1950).
4 McCoRMcK, op. cit. supra note 2, §82.
1 2 WiGO OE, EvmENcE §601; 8 id. §2228,2332.
6 2 WirROEx, EvDENcE §606. Almost all states
have abolished or reduced to a privilege the common
law disqualification of one spouse to testify for the
other in criminal cases. (See note 2) A number of
jurisdictions have altogether abolished the "for"
privilege in both civil and criminal actions, either
spouse being competent and compellable to testify for
the other. See e.g., Wis. STAT. §325.18 (1959); N.Y.
PENAL LAw §2445 (1951); LN. STAT. ANN. §2-1713,
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Today, the federal courts7 and a number of states8
authorize a spouse to testifyfor the other if both
the party spouse and witness spouse consent. The
question to be resolved is whether the motives
behind the contemporary rule, the protection of
the party spouse and marital unity, warrant its
preservation.
It is conceivable that in the hands of the party
spouse the privilege would be rarely used, for its
assertion would only deprive the party of favor-
able testimony. But, testimony, while apparently
beneficial, may have an adverse effect if the jury
believes that the witness spouse is straining or per-
verting her testimony with the hope of aiding her
counterpart. Similarly, the defendant's attorney
must also consider the possibility that testimony
"for" his client on direct examination may become
adverse on cross examination. Thus, in some
instances it may be advantageous for a defendant
to preclude his spouse from testifying "for" him.
In the hands of the witness the privilege render-
ing either spouse incompetent to testify for the
other would tend to destroy the marital harmony
any time it was claimed. Therefore, domestic
tranquility may be shattered by virtue of a rule of
law purporting to protect it.
It may be concluded that the motives of pro-
tecting the party spouse and the marriage relation-
ship justify entrusting the privilege exclusively to
the party spouse, for it should be his prerogative
to introduce evidence which he believes will aid
his case.
Another phase of the common law rule of in-
competency is the defendant's privilege to pro-
hibit his spouse from testifying against him as to
any fact, regardless of the source of the witness's
knowledge.9
Having enunciated this doctrine, the courts were
placed in an untenable position, for a spouse could
freely commit crimes against the other as long as
no other witnesses were present. To avoid such
severity, an exception based on the theory of
necessity was developed, permitting the wife to
testify against her husband when he was accused
of perpetrating a crime against her person.10
9-1603 (Burns Supp. 1960); IowA CODE §622.7-.8
(1954); VA. CODE ANN. §8-288 (1950). One state ex-
pressly adopts the common law disqualification in
criminal cases. GA. CODE §38-1603-4 (1933).7 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).8 See, e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE §1322 (1949); People v.
Ward, 50 Cal.2d 702, 328 P.2d 777 (1958).
9 8 WxGopm, EvImENcE §2334 (3d ed. 1940).
10 State v. Kollenbom, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957).
The issue which has perplexed the courts is
whether to adopt a narrow or liberal construction
of this common law exception.
To illustrate, suppose a husband shoots and
kills the mother and 13 year old sister of his wife.
The majority of jurisdictions holding either spouse
incompetent to testify against the other would
conclude that the slaying does not constitute a
crime against the wife and, therefore, she is barred
from testifying against her husband, notwith-
standing her desire'to do so.1
A general necessity exists where there is no other
witness to the facts, whereas a special necessity arises
when the spouse would be without a remedy for a
personal loss or injury. The court pointed out that the
real necessity derives its origin from the fact that
without the testimony of the wife, justice may not be
done, for the husband should not be permitted, at his
option, to exempt himself from punishment by closing
the mouth of the only witness against him.
In the past, strict interpretation of the exception as
encompassing only personal violence against the wit-
ness spouse has resulted in grave injustice. Bassett v.
United States, 137 U.S. 496 (1890) (Husband prose-
cuted for polygamy; wife not permitted to testify
against him).
However, a minority of courts have liberalized the
exception by widening the scope of the "crimes against
the other spouse" provision of the privilege to include
polygamy, adultery, bigamy, incest, abandonment,
crimes against the children of either or both, and
damage to the property of the other spouse. Schell v.
People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 Pac. 1141 (1918) (Court held
that bigamy is a crime against the wife and, therefore,
she is competent to testify against her husband).
Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929)
(Husband raped his stepdaughter; court permitted the
wife, the victim's mother to testify against her hus-
band.). O'Laughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d
543 (1932) (Wife killed stepson; husband allowed to
testify against the defendant.). State v. Kollenbor,
supra this note. (Defendant husband mistreated infant
son; wife permitted to voluntarily testify against her
husband.). Contra: Compton v. State, 13 Tex. App. 271
(1882); Omo REv. CODE TIT. 29, §2945.43 (1958);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-1802 (1956); CAL. PENAL
CODE §1322 (1956).
A corollary to the doctrine of necessity is the ex-
ception which is made in criminal actions or proceed-
ings for a crime committed against another person by a
spouse while engaged in perpetrating a crime against
the other spouse. People v. Pittulo, 116 Cal.App.2d
373, 253 P.2d 705 (1953) (Prosecution against husband
for assault on wife and third person; wife held compe-
tent witness as to both assaults.); UNronsi RuLxs or
EVIDENCE rule 28 (1953).
(i People v. Horton, 50 Cal. 2d 702, 328 P.2d 777
(1958). It may be argued that the Colorado Supreme
Court would rule differently in light of the O'Laughlin
case, supra note 10. However, one may distinguish the
two decisions on the ground that in the latter the
murder was perpetrated upon the child of the witness
spouse and consequently was a more immediate crime
against the spouse. Such a differentiation is a fiction,
for in both cases a close personal relationship between
the witness and the victim was shattered by the violent




The only possible result of such a decision is the
suppression of relevant evidence, for undoubtedly
there remains no marital affection for the court to
shelter. Perhaps, a different conclusion would be
forthcoming if the wife were the only witness to
the murder, for her testimony would then be neces-
sary to obtain a conviction. However, invocation
of the doctrine of necessity should not rest on
such a contingency, for truth and justice may be
subdued where no counter-balancing gain exists.
It would seem that the breach of family har-
mony justification for the incompetency rule is
inappropriate in a case where one spouse's crime
and the other's willingness to testify make mani-
fest a permanent rift in the marital relation.
Therefore, the exception should be extended
beyond crimes against the physical person of the
witness spouse where the nature of the offense is
the mainspring of the witness's propensity to
testify against her husband.
Generally the incompetency privilege is held to
exist as long as the marriage relationship is in
effect. Divorce or the death of either spouse
removes the bar of incompetency. 2 But, where
the marriage is entered into only for the purpose of
committing fraud or other criminal acts, should
such a relationship bar a spouse from testifying
against the other?
The Supreme Court has answered in the nega-
tive, holding that where the marriage relationship
is entered into with no intention of the parties to
live together as husband and wife, but merely for
the purposes of fraud, the spouses are competent
(but not compellable) to testify against each
other.13
In its interpretation of the common'law, 14 the
12 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
13 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953). In
this case, war veterans went through a marriage cere-
mony solely for the purpose of gaining entry into the
United States for their alien brides. The parties had an
understanding that the formal bonds would be severed
after the marriage had served its fraudulent purpose.
Contra: United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.
1949). Here, the defendant went through fictitious
marriage ceremonies to several women in order to
defraud them of funds. One of the marriages became
legal and the issue arose as to whether the lawful wife,
who had instituted divorce proceedings, could volun-
tarily testify against her defendant husband. The court
determined that the wife was incompetent to testify
because she was not a victim of the frauds her husband
was on trial for and, therefore, did not fall within the
exception for crimes committed against the spouse.
This decision is probably invalidated by the Lutzak
case.
14 FED. R. Cm P. 26. The admissibility of evidence
and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be
Court points out that the reason for the rule was to
protect the sanctity and tranquility of the marital
relationship. Since no such relationship exists in
this case, the basis for disqualifying a spouse from
giving testimony disappears and with it the rule.
The second branch of the husband-wife privi-
lege authorizes the defendant to prevent his spouse
from relating any confidential communication
which he may have made to her.0 5
Behind the law of privileged communications is
a recognition of the desirability of protecting
certain human relationships even at the expense
of suppressing relevant evidence. The social gain
to be promoted by the privilege is complete con-
fidence between spouses. The means of fostering
that gain is the assurance that if one spouse dis-
doses certain matters to the other in confidence,
that disclosure will not be revealed in court with-
out the consent of the communicating spouse.
Therefore, if a husband confides in his wife, he
possesses the privilege to prevent her from testi-
fying as to that confidence, although she may be
perfectly willing to do so.' 6
governed, except when an act of Congress or these
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they are interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience.
As Mir. Justice Stone observed in Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), the governing principles are
not necessarily as they had existed at common law. It
is open to the courts to say whether they will abrogate
the common law rule disqualifying one spuse from
testifying in criminal cases against the other spouse.
16 A heretofore stated (see notes 2 and 3), a majority
of jurisdictions view either spouse competent to testify
for or against the other in a criminal proceeding, but
have retained by statute the confidential communica-
tions privilege whereby a defendant may deter his
spouse from revealing certain evidence.
In California, Oregon, and Minnesota, both privi-
leges are operative. At first glance it may appear
superfluous to entrust the defendant with two means of
restraining his wife's testimony, but situations do arise
in which the incompetency privilege will not be avail-
able. For instance, suppose that the defendant confides
in his wife that he intends to- commit embezzlement.
If, prior to the trial, the marriage were dissolved by
divorce, the ex-wife of the defendant would be compe-
tent to testify against him. The defendant could, how-
ever, suppress this damaging evidence by relying upon
the confidential communications privilege which
survives the marriage.
16 8 WiGmonx, EvImENCE §2332 (3d ed. 1940). "Four
fundamental conditions may be predicated as necessary
to the establishment of a privilege against the dis-
closure of communications between persons standing in
a given relation: (1) the communications must originate
in confidence that they will not be disclosed (2) this
element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties (3) the relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be fostered and
preserved (4) the injury that would inure to the rela-
1961]
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In order for the communication to be incor-
porated within the rule, the communicator must
intend it to be confidential. Communications
between spouses, privately made, are generally
assumed to have been intended to be confidential
and, therefore, they are privileged.17 But, whenever
a communication, because of its nature or the cir-
cumstances under which it is made, is obviously
not intended to be confidential it is not privi-
leged.'8 The test of confidentiality used by the
courts is whether the communicator relied on the
confidence and intimacy of the marital relation in
making the disclosure to his spouse.19 Therefore,
it may be said that in order for a communication
to be privileged, it must be intended to be both
confidential and private.
20
tion by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation." The concept may be somewhat
unrealistic, for it is doubtful that a husband, at the time
he confides in his wife, considers the possibility that
his remarks will later be revealed by her in court.
However, this criticism is not totally convincing in that
a marriage relationship may stimulate a husband to
trust his wife with knowledge whereas he would not
relate such information to others for fear of exposure.
"7 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
18 People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104
N.Y.S.2d 139 (1951). The defendant husband was
convicted of murder. In the course of a loud quarrel
with his wife while they were alone, the defendant
threatened to kill anyone he saw. The court admitted
the testimony of the wife pertaining to this statement
on the ground that the defendant, by shouting and
failing to heed his wife's warning that the neighbors
might overhear him, did not intend to rely on the
conjugal privilege.
However, in Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498,
83 A.2d 401 (1951), a different decision was reached
even though the communicator's voice was audible to
third persons. Here, the husband and wife engaged in a
violent conversation within the confines of 'their bed-
room. But, unknown to the wife, the husband had
stationed their son in an adjoining room for the purpose
of recording the verbal exchange. The court asserted
that the communications were confidential and refused
to admit the recording as evidence.
It may be argued that the Hunter case is based upon
the thought that the wife, although shouting, still
intended that her remarks be heard only by her hus-
band. A person's emotional condition may induce him
to speak lustily even when he wishes his communica-
tion to reach only the party to whom he is speaking.
An additional fact supporting this rationale is that in
McCormack the wife warned her husband that he
would be heard by others. Perhaps if such a caution
had been advanced in Hunter, the conversation would
have been admitted. But, this is unlikely in that the
opinion of the court strongly suggests that the basis
for the holding is repugnance for the trap set by the
husband.
19 Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wagner,
75 Ariz. 82, 251 P.2d 897 (1952).
20 Wolfle v. United States, supra note 14.
The problem is to formulate criteria to be used
by the courts in ascertaining whether a communi-
cation was meant to be confidential. From the
divergent results reached in People v. McCormack
and Hunter v. Hunter,2 it is apparent that any
test adopted must be flexible. The courts must
look to all of the circumstances surrounding the
communication before including it within the
privilege.
An area of intense controversy relates to the
scope of the term "communication." Apart from
statutory provisions which have expressly ex-
tended the privilege to include acts, facts, trans-
actions, and other matters beyond spoken or
written communications, the cases disagree as to
whether the statutes which say "communications"
should be construed to expand the privilege beyond
oral and written utterances."
The liberal view is that in order to effectively
protect the marriage relation and encourage con-
fidence between the spouses, the term "communi-
cation" must be construed to cover not merely
written or spoken words, but also acts performed
privately within the presence of the spouse. The
general phraseology of the cases so holding is that
any act arising out of and performed because of
confidence in the marital relation and which would
not have been known but for such confidential
relation is privileged.n Some courts go even further
and hold that any information secured by the
wife which would not have been known in the
absence of such relation is protected.2
4
21 See note 18 supra.
2Tabbah v. United States, 217 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.
1955). The confidential communications privilege ex-
tends only to utterances (written or oral) and not to
acts; contra: People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86
N.E.2d 172 (1949). The privilege embraces both ut-
terances and acts done within the presence of the
spouse.
2Id. at 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949). State v. Robbins,
35 Wash.2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950) (Here the husband
was charged with automobile theft. His former wife
testified that while she was applying for a license for
the stolen car, her husband was waiting outside in an
automobile. The court held that this amounted to a
privileged communication.). Menefee v. Comm., 189
Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9 (1949) (Wife's testimony as to
husband's leaving home before robbery, as to time of
returning, as to his placing pistol on mantle, and as to
her driving with him near the location where the safe
was hidden; held a privileged communication privately
made.).
2Knowledge of certain facts obtained by discovery
or observation is protected by the privilege. Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Pierce's Adm'x, 270 Ky. 216, 109 S.W.2d
616 (1937) (knowledge gained by wife from the entry
of husband's birth in his family bible); Monaghan v.
Green, 265 Ill. 233, 106 N.E. 792 (1914) (privilege
[Vol. 52
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Behind the doctrine is the belief that to limit
the privilege to oral or written communications
would not conform to the intention of the parties.
Of necessity, a spouse must disclose acts and facts
as well as oral and written communications in the
normal course of living and if the law does not
protect the former, it betrays the confidence
derived from the marriage.20
A narrower concept has been adopted by Dean
Wigmore and a number of courts. They maintain
that only utterances and not acts, except in special
circumstances, should constitute a privileged com-
munication.26 However, if the intention of the
communicating spouse was to make this conduct
the subject of confidential knowledge, Wigmore
would concede the existence of a privileged com-
munication. This intent must be manifested in the
form of an invitation of the spouse's presence or
attention for the purpose of bringing the act
directly to her knowledge.2
covers testimony as to facts learned from observation).
Under this theory it is conceivable that a wife's dis-
covery of stolen goods concealed by her husband would
be regarded a privileged communication:. However, in
People v. Daghita, supra note 22, the court stressed
that the defendant did not attempt to conceal or dis-
guise his conduct (bringing home stolen property),
thereby inferring that had the defendant's wife un-
covered the incriminating evidence such would not
have been a privileged confidential communication.2
5 Dickinson v. Abernathy Furniture Co., 231 Mo.
App. 303, 96 S.W.2d 1086 (1936).
26 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2337; Pereira v. United
States, supra note 12; State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181,
260 Pac. 138 (1927) (Burglary; wife's testimony
to the receipt of articles from her husband as a gift
admitted); Posner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56
Ariz. 202, 106 P.2d 488 (1940) (former husband's
testimony that he purchased insulin for the plaintiff
and saw her make tests of her urine, not privileged);
United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943)
(Prosecution for transporting wife in interstate com-
merce for purposes of prostitution; held, wife's testi-.
mony as to husband's act of taking money from her
not privileged.). Professor McCormick (§83) cites the-
latter case as standing for the proposition that acts
are not within the scope of the privilege. But, it is
submitted that perhaps the decision rests on the "crimes
against the other spouse" exception to the privilege
and that had the wife not been the woman transported
she may have been precluded from testifying. See
note 60.
278 WiGuoRE, EVIDENCE §2337. For example, the
husband bringing home a package of valuables and
calling his wife's attention, "Note that I place this in
the desk". In effect the husband communicates to her
not only the words, but also the act of placing the
package. Would Wigmore view the act as a privileged
communication if the invitation of the husband were
also nonverbal (pointing to the package)?
Other advocates of this theory have rejected Wig-
more's nebulous restriction and have indicated a more
proper condition by requiring that the communication
be made by virtue of and in consequence of the marital
The better view is that the confidential com-
munications privilege should not be deemed to
protect those acts which are criminal, for otherwise
an impregnable obstacle to the attainment of jus-
tice would be created. Whereas the witness spouse
would in all such instances be competent to testify
against the other spouse, she would be compellable
only if the trial judge should find that the admis-
sion of evidence outweighs the preservation of
marital harmony.2
The privilege is applicable only to communica-
tions made during coverture. Therefore, a con-
fidential communication made before the mar-
riage,2 9 or while the husband and wife are living
in separation, or while in unlawful cohabitation,"0
is not privileged. However, a privileged communi-
cation made during coverture, is preserved even
after the marriage has been terminated by death
or divorce.3'
Under certain conditions it may be unjust not
to recognize an exception where the spouse holding
the privilege (communicator) is deceased. Accord-
ingly, the surviving spouse should be allowed to
waive the privilege (a) either in the interest of the
deceased where he would have waived it (e.g.,
fraudulent conveyance alleged), or (b) for the
exoneration of the surviving mate (as where a wife
is alleged to have corruptly destroyed her de-
relation. Thus, only those acts which would not have
been known but for the confidence arising from the
relation are privileged. We notice that the verbal ex-
pression of this exception is indistinguishable from the
liberal doctrine. In practical application, however, the
courts adhering to the strict rule do not readily apply
this language of exception to physical acts. Smith v.
State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926) (Husband
convicted for murder; wife permitted to testify as to
defendant's disposal of the victim's body. Court held
the testimony admissible on the ground that the man-
ner in which the acts were performed indicated that
they were not intended to be confidential communica-
tions to the wife.).
2 As may be observed this proposal creates a qualified
privilege in the hands of the witness spouse. Such dis-
cretionary power to determine when the privilege may
be asserted must be vested in the court by legislative
enactment, for every jurisdiction has some statutory
provision relating to the confidential communications
privilege and/or the incompetency privilege. Where the
wife is compelled to testify against her husband by
court order, the danger of false testimony is present,
But, the safeguards of oath, cross-examination, and
demeanor neutralize this vulnerable point.
2 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1943).
30 8 WiGitoE, EVIDENCE §2335.31 Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir.
1935). People v. Ignofd 315 Mich. 626, 24 N.W.2d




ceased husband's papers and his consent is sought
to be evidenced by her).E
Generally, a statutory exception is made to the
privilege in divorce actions," civil proceedings by
one spouse against the other, and criminal wrongs
inflicted by one spouse upon the other. In these
situations the communicatee is permitted to
divulge confidential communications.31 Absent a
statute, a spouse may testify as to confidential
communications only where there has been a
personal wrong or crime committed against her
person.' 6 Where there is no existing statutory
provision and the crime against the spouse does
not involve physical injuries, a few courts have
been reluctant to allow the aggrieved spouse
(communicatee) to relate confidential communi-
cations.36 In the trial of a controversy between the
spouses, such an application of the privilege where
the communicatee needs the evidence of commu-
nications works an injustice.
One phrase of the rule which has proved trouble-
some for the courts is whether the privilege should
sanctify a confidential communication which is
made in reference to the planning or commission
4 8 WiGmoRx, EViDENcE §2341.
"West v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. 312, 164 Pac. 327
t1917).
34 Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 590 (1952); MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE rule 216 (1942). "Neither of the spouses
has a privilege ... in
a. an action by one of them for annulment of mar-
riage or for divorce or separation from the other,
or for damages for the alienation of the affections
of the other, or for criminal conversation with the
other, or
b. an action for damages for injury done by one of
them to the person or property of the other, in-
cluding an action for wrongful death of the other,
or
c. a criminal action in which one of them is charged
with-
(1) a crime against the person or property of
the other or a child of either, or
(2) a crime against the person or property of a
third person committed in the course of
committing a crime against the other, or
(3) bigamy or adultery, or
(4) desertion of the other or of the child of
either, or
d. a criminal action in which the accused offers evi-
dence of a communication between him and his
spouse."
35 United States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237 (E.D.
Mich. 1949); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006
(2d Cir. 1943). (Wife may voluntarily testify to com-
munications referring to her transportation in interstate
commerce for purposes of prostitution)
36 People v. Ernst, 306 Ill. 452, 138 N.E. 116 (1923)
(defendant husband charged with forging wife's name
was not permitted to testify to his wife's statements
authorizing him to sign her name). Contra: Rowley v.
Rowley, 144 Okla. 160, 290 Pac. 179 (1930) (Mortgage
obtained by duress; wife's testimony as to her husband's
threats admitted.).
of a crime or tort. An example of the view adopted
by numerous state tribunals is State v. Pizzvlotto.N
Here the defendant-husband, prior to the alleged
assault for which he was tried, told his wife that
he planned to kill the prosecutrix. The court held
the communication privileged and added that the
privilege belonged to the defendant (communica-
tor), his wife being unable to waive it for him
even though she was hostile and eager to testify.
It would seem the better view that any com-
munication, regardless of the relationship of the
parties, made in connection with the planning or
commission of a crime should not fall within the
purview of any privilege available to the defendant
spouse.3s The witness spouse should be held com-
petent to testify as to the communications (includ-
ing acts), but should be compellable only when the
trial judge discerns that the evidence admitted
tips the scales against protecting the marriage.39
When an otherwise privileged communication is
overheard by a third person, either surreptitiously
or openly, the cases permit the third person to
testify to what he heard, in spite of the fact that
the communication remains privileged as between
the spouses.40
There are, however, several exceptions to this
general proposition. If the privileged communica-
tion is made in the presence of or through a con-
fidential agent of either of the parties, his presence
will not revoke the privilege.4 ' The Supreme Court
in Wolfle v. United States4 seems to suggest a more
comprehensive exception: where the confidential
communication must by reasonable necessity be
made in the presence of or through a third party,
"209 La. 644, 25 So.2d 292 (1946); Dickinson v.
Abernathy Furniture Co., supra note 25. At least two
federal courts have taken the position that confidential
communications between husband and wife which aid
the commission of a crime are not covered by the
privilege. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th
Cir. 1944); United States v. Mitchell, supra note 29.
"MODEL CODE OP EVIDENCE rule 217 (1942);
UNIFORm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE rule 28 (1953).
9See note 28 supra.
40 State v. Thorne, 43 Wash.2d 46, 260 P.2d 331
(1953); Gannon v. State, 127 Ill. 507, 21 N.E. 525
(1900); People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill.2d 409, 125 N.E.2d
518 (1955).41 Baldwin v. Comm., 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942).
A client may speak safely in front of or through his
attorney's secretary or law clerk; and a patient in the
presence of or through the physician's private nurse.
42 291 U.S. 7 (1934). Here a stenographer was per-
mitted to testify as to pazttof a letter (from the husband
to his wife) dictated to her by the defendant spouse.
The Court conceded that the communication was of a
confidential nature, but held that it was not private,
for normally husband and wife may conveniently com-
municate without stenographic aid.
[Vol. 52
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENT
that person is prohibited from repeating the com-
munication in court. Inu other words, if the con-
fidential communication cannot be conveniently
relayed except in the presence of or through a
third party, perhaps it will remain privileged as to
the third person.4
The majority -of jurisdictions recognize still
another important qualification to the eaves-
dropper rule, namely, that the third person may
not recite what he overheard when in conspiracy
with the communicatee-spouse."
For documents of communication coming into
the possession of a third party the law also makes a
distinction. If the third party acquires possession
or learns the contents of the written communica-
tion from one spouse to the other by interception,
45
or through loss or misdelivery by a messenger,
46
the privilege will not apply and the third person
may testify as to the contents. However, when the
delivery or disclosure of the document is due to
the voluntary betrayal or connivance of the
spouse to whom the message is directed, the privi-
lege is extended to include the interceptor and he
is, therefore, not allowed to recite the confidential
writing.Y
The eavesdropper and interception cases appear
to be based upon the thought that since the com-
43Suppose a husband shares a confidential com-
munication with his wife over the telephone. May the
telephone operator testify to the conversation? If the
husband and wife were unable to conveniently com-
municate without using the telephone, perhaps the
operator would be precluded from testifying.
4Hunter v. Hunter, supra note 18. Compare Erlick
v. Erlick, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st
Dep't. 1951) where voice recordings of a telephone
conversation between the wife and her attorney, the
latter dictating a letter of reconciliation to the husband
to be used at the separation proceedings, were ruled
admissible. The distinction is that in Hunter the hus-
band-communicatee was aware that the communica-
tion was being recorded. But, in Rirlick neither party to
the communication knew that it was being transcribed.45Batchelor v. State, 217 Ark. 340, 23d S.W.2d 23
(1950). (Letter written by a husband to his wife and
intercepted by jailer, without the aid of the wife, may
be introduced as evidence.); Connella v. Ter., 16
Okla. 365, 86 Pac. 72 (1906) (letter from defendant to
his wife, sent by messenger; letter came into possession
of sheriff).4
6Hammons v. State, 73 Ark. 495, 84 S.W. 718
(1905) (letter to wife from defendant in jail delivered
by messenger to wife's father); O'Toole v. Ohio German
Fire Insurance Co., 159 Mich. 187, 123 N.W. 795
(1909) (letter from wife to husband, dropped and lost
by husband).
4 McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 637, 155 S.E. 452
(1930). (husband's letters disclosed by wife to third
persons). There are a substantial number of cases
which disregard this element of betrayal and hold the
privilege not applicable. See State v. Sysinger, 25 S.D.
110, 125 N.W. 879 (1910) (prisoner's letter to wife,
delivered by her to State's Attorney).
municating spouse can usually take effective pre-
cautions against disclosure, he should bear the
risk of failure -to take such measures. Therefore,
where the communicator does everything within
his power to keep his communication secret, the
privilege should be expanded to bar the third party
interceptor from relating the message.45
Interwoven with the substantive law of the
husband-wife privilege, is the complex procedural
question of who has standing to invoke the privi-
lege.
With regard to that privilege which makes the
witness spouse incompetent to testify against the
party spouse, the states' are far from uniform in
their views on the standing issue.
In those jurisdictions which make the witness
spouse incompetent in most situations to testify
against the defendant spouse, the incompetency
may not be waived, notwithstanding the consent
of both the party spouse and the witness spouse.
49
However, where the husband commits a crime
against his wife within the common law exception,
she may testify over his objection.5" In several of
these jurisdictions it has been held that where the
witness spouse comes within the exception, she
may be compelled to testify as any other witness.
The reasoning generally given is that the public
policy in having the wife testify to punish a crimi-
nal outweighs any desires on her part and also
predominates over the public policy of preserving
the marriage.51
In the majority of states, either spouse is by
statute a competent witness against the other in
all criminal cases and may testify as to any occur-
rences which do not infringe upon the confidential
communications privilege.u However, several of
these statutes provide either that the defendant
has the privilege of refusing to permit his spouse
to testify against him," or that the witness spouse
48 Authority seems to deny the privilege in these
situations: Comm. v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E.
209 (1918) (dictaphone planted in cell where husband
and wife were held); Ward v. State, 70 Ark. 204, 66
S.W. 926 (1902) (Letter to wife given by husband in
jail to wife and seized by officers; letter admissible.).
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2; 97-4 (1939); OxLA. STAT. tit.
22, §702 (1951). IowA CODE §622.7 (1950); Tx.
CRn. PRoc. AwN. art. 714 (Vernon 1948); Oaio REv.
CODE ANN. §2945.42 (Page 1954); GA. CODE §38-1604
(1933); N.C. GEN. STAT. §8-57 (1953); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §41-12-20 (1953).
50 Ibid.
51 Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351 (1882); Bramlette
v. State, 21 Tex. App. 611, 2 S.W. 765 (1886); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §631, 683 (1930).
52 See note 2 supra.
53 See e.g., MiN. STAT. ANN. §595.02 (1947).
19611
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENT
has a privilege not to testify,M or that both parties
must consent before the witness spouse is per-
mitted to take the stand.55
It may be observed that where the privilege
accrues to the defendant, the witness spouse
would be precluded from testifying against her
husband over his objection even where the crime
was against her person. To combat this injustice,
the legislatures have created exceptions permitting
the witness to testify over the defendant's objec-
tion.56 In those states where the privilege'belongs
exclusively to the witness spouse, exceptions are
unnecessary, a statement that the spouse is com-
petent in all cases in which she chooses to testify
being adequate to protect her rights.
Ten jurisdictions have abolished the common
law incompetency privilege in its entirety either
by statute or by court interpretation. The witness
spouse is deemed competent to testify, and "com-
petent" has generally been interpreted to mean
compellable as any other witness. The only re-
straint on testimony by the spouse in these states
is the confidential communications privilege. 7
Apart from the general statutes conferring the
privilege, a number of jurisdictions have enacted
legislation to cover specific situations arising with-
in the framework of the husband-wife privilege.5s
54 KAr. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-1420 (1949); R.I.
GEN. LAws ch. 537, §17 (1938); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 233, §20 (1954).
'5 CA.. PEN. CODE §1322 (1949); People v. Ward,
supra note 8.
16 Ono GEN. CODE ANN. §13444-2 (1939) (bigamy);
CAL. PENAL CODE §1322 (1949) (adultery); ARiz.
CODE ANN. §44-2702 (1939) (rape); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§27.916 (Supp. 1949) (crimes against the children of
either or both of the spouses); OHIO GEN. CODE: ANN.,
supra this note (abandonment).
57 See e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §2-1713, 2-1714,
9-1603 (Burns Supp. 1960) Dwigans v. State, 222 Ind.
434, 54 N.E.2d 100 (1944); Vukodonovich, v. State,
197 Ind. 169, 150 N.E. 56 (1926). FLA. STAT. §932.31
(1955).
58 Note, 38 VA. L. REv. 359, 365 (1952). Twenty-six
states make the spouse both competent and compell-
able to testify either for or against the defendant spouse
in cases of desertion and non-support, despite statutory
provisions concerning confidential communications.
Several jurisdictions have enacted legislation de-
signed to eliminate obstacles to the successful prosecu-
tion of a husband who induces his wife into prostitution.
The wife has been considered competent to testify
against her spouse without his consent. A few states
have gone even further by compelling the witness
spouse to testify.
A third special situation arises with reference to
seduction. Where the defendant avoided prosecution
by marrying the accusing female followed by immediate
desertion, a few states make the wife competent to
testify in such an action if the defendant husband
deserts within a specified period after marriage.
In contrast to the states, standing to envoke the
privilege in the federal courts is not regulated by
statute, but has been the product of judicial evolu-
tion. When first called upon to decide the issue,
the Supreme Court adopted and consistently
applied the common law rule of total incom-
petency of either s. ouse to testify against the
other, unless the case, involved personal injuries
to the witness spouse.59 However, in Hawkins v.
United States6" the Court acknowledged that
"over the years the rule has evolved from the
common law disqualification to a rule which bars
the testimony of one spouse against the other
unless both consent."
A majority of courts hold that the marital
51 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U;S. 209 (1839); Bassett v.
United States, 137 U.S. 496 (1890). It is the general
rule that neither a husband or wife can be a witness for
or against the other . .. except where the husband
commits an offense against the person of the wife.
Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir.
1948): "A spouse is incompetent to testify against the
other in a criminal proceeding, unless the defendant
committed the offense against the person of the witness
spouse. It may be that 'in the light of reason and ex-
perience' the Supreme Court will find it desirable to
remove the incompetency of a wife as a witness in a
criminal case against her husband, but it has not yet
done so."
During this period, many of the circuit courts took
exception to the Supreme Court, interpreting the rule
as a privilege rather than an absolute disqualification.
Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914).
At common law the husband and wife were each under
total disability to testify for the other, but the dis-
ability did not extend to testimony of one spouse,
against the other. Such testimony of one against the
other was excluded, unless both the husband and wife
waived the privilege and consented to its admission.
Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
Defendant was convicted of income tax evasion. The
court held that a husband or wife cannot be compelled
to testify against the other and cannot be permitted
to do so unless the other spouse consents. The rule is a
privilege.
60 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958)
(Where the wife is not the woman transported in inter-
state commerce for immoral purposes she may not
testify over her husband's objection even though she
volunteers to do so.); Compare, Wyatt v. United
States, 80 S. Ct. 901 (1960) (Where the Mann Act
violation is against the person of the wife, she is both
competent and compellable to testify against her
husband). In light of Wyatt, it may be argued that the
Supreme Court has abolished the privilege in its en-
tirety, making the witness spouse both competent and
compellable. However, a close reading of the case gives
the impression that the rule announced applies only to
Mann Act prosecutions in which the wife was the
woman transported in interstate commerce for immoral
purposes. Therefore, it is submitted that where the
criminal proceeding does not involve an infringement of
the Mann Act or where the woman transported in
violation of the act is not the witness spouse the dual
privilege announced in Hawkins is controlling.
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privilege based upon the incompetency of the
witness spouse cannot be waived by the defendant
unless he expressly consents to his spouse testify-
ing.6 A few jurisdictions assert that the party
spouse waives the privilege by failing to make a
timely and properly stated objection when his
spouse is called as a witness against him. 2 Likewise,
it has been held that the party spouse waives the
privilege when he calls his wife to testify for him,
thereby making the spouse a compellable witness
for the adverse party. 3
Contrary to the sharp division of authority as
to who possesses the incompetency privilege, the
privilege to prevent the disclosure of confidential
communications between husband and wife is,
by the vast majority of cases, held to belong to the
communicating spouse. 4
Another dissimilarity between the two privileges
is that the spouse possessing the confidential
communication privilege may waive it in a variety
of ways. 65 First, the accused may waive the privi-
lege by failing to raise a timely objection to tke
testimony of his spouse."6 Second, the, privilege
may be canceled by out of court conduct. 7 Third,
if the defendant calls his spouse to testify for him
he may relinquish the privilege. Fourth, a volun-
tary disclosure to a third person may eliminate
118 Wix oRE, EVIENCE §2334. A waiver by the
party spouse makes the witness spouse competent to
testify, but she will be compellable only where the party
spouse alone possesses the privilege.
2 See People v. Singh, 182 Cal. 457, 482, 188 Pac.
987, 998 (1920), where it was held that a general objec-
tion that the evidence is incompetent, irrelevant, and
immaterial is not ordinarily, if ever, sufficient to chal-
lenge the proffered testimony as privileged. Contra:
Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1958)
which held that where the crime was not committed
against the witness spouse, she is incompetent to testify
unless the party spouse waives the privilege. Consent
must be given by the defendant to the witness and the
fact that no objection is raised by the defendant when
the witness spouse testifies is not a waiver of the privi-
lege.
6 Note, 8 STANFoRD L. REv. 420 (1956), Steinburg
v. Meany, 53 Cal. 425 (1879).
64 See e.g., Fraser v. United States, supra note 37;
People v. McCormack, supra note 18.
65 When the party spouse waives the privilege the
witness spouse is compellable. Allen v. State, 36 Okla.
Cr. 64, 248 Pac. 655 (1926).
66 Bernell v. State, 74 Okla. Cr. 92, 123 P.2d 289
(1942).
6 State v. Clark, 26 Wash. 2d 160, 173 P.2d 189
(1946). Here the husband and wife were co-defendants
in a murder prosecution. The wife, in the presence of
her husband, made a voluntary out-of-court admission
implicating him. The court held that the husband's
silence implied consent for the wife to testify.
( Hampton v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 291, 123 P. 571
(1912).
the privilege.69 Fifth, the privilege may be waived
by the defendant testifying to conversations with
his spouse, in which case the prosecution may
interrogate his spouse on rebuttal.
70
The basic problem in the area of standing to
invoke the privilege is not that of determining
what the courts will do in certain cases, but rather
whether the application of the common law is
justifiable.
Underlying the retention of the common law
privilege is the zeal of the legislatures and the
judiciary to preserve marital harmony by prevent-
ing ill feelings which might result from one spouse
testifying against the other. In view of the mount-
ing divorce rate in this country, a sound rule
tending to perpetuate marriages is desirable. On
the other hand, the rule hampers the administra-
tion of justice by excluding valuable evidence,
even where the marriage serves no useful social
purpose or where the husband and wife, irrespec-
tive of the outcome of the case, will never -cohabit
again. Choosing between the two arguments
involves a value judgment which may be guided
more by personal philosophy rather than by legal
principles.
To develop an intelligent solution one must
inquire as to the validity of the presumption that
the rule tends to sustain the marital relationship.
History points out that while the social and eco-
nomic forces of society are working to break up
the family relationship, the law of evidence is
making a rather ineffectual effort to stem the tide
by sacrificing justice to a legendary family unity1'
Accordingly, a vitalizing transformation of the
privilege would be timely.
One approach would treat a spouse both com-
petent and compellable to testify against the other
in criminal proceedings, notwithstanding the dis-
closure of confidential communications. However,
this solution does not protect against the situation
where a wife does not wish to testify against her
husband, for it presupposes that the admissibility
of evidence invariably outweighs the value of
marital harmony. But the scales do not always tip
in favor of introducing testimony and thus an
equitable modification of the proposal is indis-
pensable. Such a limitation would be to vest the
trial judge with discretionary power to balance the
0 Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E. 763 (1924).
10 Allen v. State, supra note 63.
71 Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the




consequences as he does in determining the
relevancy of evidence.
Conceding that it is unlikely that the privilege
will soon be totally abolished, perhaps a more
immediate solution would be to entrust the privi-
lege to the witness spouse. The witness alone would
be the one to ascertain whether the marriage
is worth saving, just as it is his or her prerogative
to determine the value of the marriage before
filing suit for divorce.3 Surely, if a spouse can end
the marital relationship by her own wish, she
should also be permitted to commit a lesser act
which may only weaken the marriage. Moreover,
the courts would then be free of the burden of
deciding which marriages are to be preserved and
which are, when weighed against the need for
relevant evidence, detrimental to society or un-
worthy of shielding.
The claiming of the privilege by the defendant
spouse more likely will be based on self-interest
and not on a desire to save the marriage. It fol-
lows, then, that such a rule would reduce the
number of occasions on which a marriage is em-
ployed by the defendant as a decoy to hide deceit-
ful and criminal activities; activities which,
though not constituting a personal injury to the
spouse, tend to create a feeling of repulsion for the
marital partner.
An inconclusive argument raised by the critics
of this corrective is that giving the privilege to the
witness spouse alone places a weapon of coercion
in that spouse's hands. Even if we were to stretch
our imagination to believe that a layman considers
the legal ramifications before he speaks or acts it
is not undesirable to use coercion to prevent
criminal conduct.
In retrospect, it may be concluded that the vital
issue is not who should hold the privilege, but
rather when should the holder of the privilege be
allowed to invoke it in a criminal prosecution.
The solution, while not a panacea, is to acknowl-
edge that the privilege is not an absolute but a
qualified one, which must relent if the trial judge
finds that the evidence is required to effectively
fulfill the judicial function.73 In refusing to allow
the privilege to be asserted there are several
27 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)
(spouse may obtain a binding divorce with or without
the consent of the other spouse).
71The suggestion must be effected by legislative
enactment, for all jurisdictions now have a statute
refering to the incompetency privilege and or the con-
fidential communications privilege.
factors to be weighed by the court against the
necessity of bringing in relevant evidence.
First, is the possibility that a rupture of the
marital relationship may result if the wife is per-
mitted to incriminate her husband. Where the
spouse is willing to testify, the trial judge may
conclude that no marital harmony remains to
justify excluding relevant evidence. However,
should the wife refuse to take the stand against
her husband, a presumption of marital fidelity is
raised which should be overcome only if her testi-
mony is essential for the state to prove its case.
If the prosecution is able to establish the defend-
ant's guilt by other means, the spouse should not
be compellable, for justice will be served without
shattering the marriage.
A second consideration the court will be re-
quired to take note of is the threat of perjured
testimony. Where the wife is a voluntary witness
against her husband, the accuracy and reliability
of her testimony may be questionable if she is
prompted by spite or revenge. Similarly, if the
witness spouse is compelled to testify she may
falsify her remarks in order to protect her hus-
band. Nevertheless, the risk of perjury should
not cause undue reluctance to apply the rule, for
the safeguards of oath, cross examination, and
demeanor are present.
Still another consequence to be weighed is the
attitude of society toward a recommendation
making either spouse competent and compellable
to testify against the other. It is conceivable that a
wave of repugnance for such legislation would
be the initial reaction, for the thought of a husband
being convicted on evidence supplied by his wife
does indeed strike a sour note. Thus, the question
posed is whether the possibility of public distaste
and opposition should influence the operation of
the qualified privilege and, if so, to what extent.
When one considers that only a small number of
persons will ever be affected by the rule and that
a substantial benefit will be derived from attaining
justice, it seems that public pressure should play
no role at all in determining the fate of the evi-
dentiary privilege. However, although such a
position is sound theoretically, when viewed in
practical terms it is naive to discount the per-
suasive force exerted by society upon their repre-
sentatives in the legislature and judiciary. There-
fore, because of the unknown human element one
can only assert that the privilege should be in-
dependent of any consideration as to what the
people think of it; whether this sound approach
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